The Deviation Was Closed. The Risk Authorization Never Existed.
Investigator reviewed Deviation Report DR-2023-0441 for Vancomycin Hydrochloride for Injection 500 mg, Lot 2023-2208, including the deviation investigation report and CAPA closure documentation.
The firm could not produce documentation of the risk assessment supporting the root cause determination, evidence ruling out systemic and equipment-based causes, or the risk basis for retraining as adequate corrective action.
21 CFR 211.192 requires investigation of unexplained discrepancies in production. Absent documentation identifying who authorized the risk assessment and on what evidentiary basis systemic and equipment causes were eliminated, the closure determination cannot be verified during inspection.
A deviation closure authorization documenting systematic cause elimination, corrective action risk rationale, and the named decision owner would have made this closure inspection-defensible.
The inspector pulled the deviation log. It was documented. Then they asked: "Who authorized the risk disposition, and what was the rationale for that classification?"
That question ends careers. Not because the deviation was mishandled — but because the authorization logic was never captured as a formal record.
This case file gives you that record.
During inspection of Deviation Report DR-2023-0441 for Vancomycin Hydrochloride for Injection 500 mg, Lot 2023-2208, the investigator noted the investigation concluded with an assignable cause of operator technique variation during aseptic fill on Line 3 and was closed with a retraining CAPA. The investigator requested documentation of who authorized the risk assessment supporting that determination, what evidence was reviewed to rule out systemic and equipment-based causes, and what risk basis supported retraining as adequate corrective action for an aseptic fill deviation. No authorization record responsive to any of these questions was produced.
"Who authorized the risk assessment supporting the operator technique determination, what evidence was reviewed to eliminate systemic and equipment-based causes, and what risk basis supports retraining as adequate corrective action for an aseptic fill deviation?"
For aseptic manufacturing deviations, the investigator's concern is specifically whether systemic and equipment-based causes were formally evaluated and eliminated — because an undetected systemic cause represents an ongoing patient safety risk.
| What Existed | What Was Missing |
|---|---|
| ✓ Deviation report DR-2023-0441 opened within required timeframe | → Authorization of the risk assessment for the assignable cause determination |
| ✓ Assignable cause stated: operator technique variation | → Documented evidence eliminating systemic causes across Line 3 operations |
| ✓ CAPA issued for targeted operator retraining — completed 6 October 2023 | → Documented evidence eliminating equipment-based causes |
| ✓ QA signature on deviation closure page | → Risk assessment for adequacy of retraining as corrective action |
| ✓ Lot 2023-2208 released with notation of closed deviation | → Named individual responsible for the closure authorization |
The complete case file contains the full DDR reconstruction, authorization model, and structural controls — formatted for direct inspection use.
Produce the authorization record → $149 No account required · Delivered immediately